I am a Chinese writer and social activist currently living in Europe. China is one of the world’s most important carbon-emitting countries and, like other countries around the world, is facing the impacts of climate change. China has experienced droughts, heatstroke, floods, epidemics, and other disasters closely related to climate change, causing many people to die or fall ill and suffer property losses.

I am a Chinese writer and social activist currently living in Europe. China is one of the world’s most significant carbon emitters and, like other countries around the world, is facing the impacts of climate change. China has experienced droughts, heatstroke, floods, epidemics, and other disasters closely related to climate change, causing many people to die or fall ill and suffer property losses.

However, because of China’s political system and educational model, the public lacks the awareness and capacity to pay attention to and participate in issues concerning the climate crisis. Many people are completely unaware of the relationship between the climate crisis and the disasters occurring around them. Some also believe that climate change is false, or that it is a natural phenomenon rather than something caused by human activity.

In this article, I discuss the real dangers of the climate crisis, China’s situation and role in climate change, and the psychology and attitudes of Chinese people in confronting the climate crisis. I have also carried out some in-person advocacy in Germany, where I live, to raise awareness of climate issues related to China. However, as an individual with very limited influence, what I have been able to achieve has been extremely limited, and there has been little response. As the climate crisis intensifies, alongside increasingly severe political and ethnic conflicts around the world, I have become increasingly pessimistic.

Nevertheless, I am still publishing this article in the hope that more people around the world will understand China’s severely overlooked role and situation in the climate crisis, as well as its rights and responsibilities and its future fate.

Thank you.

Wang Qingmin

China and Its People Under the Climate Change Crisis 1

The Harms of Global Warming and the Responses 1

The Rights and Wrongs Concerning “Chai Jing Interviews Ding Zhongli” 3

The Fallacies of Ding Zhongli 6

The Interpretations, Reactions, and Paradoxes of the Chinese People Toward Climate Issues and Related Western Criticisms 8

What China Should Not Do and Should Do Regarding Climate Issues 9

From the Chinese Public’s Mockery of Greta Thunberg to an Examination of Mindsets and Values 11

Is it really so necessary and urgent to curb global warming? 19

Climate Issues and the Human Condition under Climate Policy 20

In recent years, the issue of climate change has become a global hotspot. Climate change refers to the rapid rise of Earth’s temperature and the increasing frequency of extreme weather since the Industrial Revolution, especially in recent decades.

As for the causes of this climate change, they almost unanimously point to human activities. To quote this definitional statement from Wikipedia (of course, this is not to say that Wikipedia itself is authoritative, but that its sources are authoritative—the following words come from the Tampa Bay Times, winner of 13 Pulitzer Prizes, and NASA), and the content is verifiable, concise, and highly summarizing: there is currently a strong scientific consensus that human economic activity has caused global warming in recent decades, and on the fact that “in recent decades, human-caused global warming exists and is occurring,” there is no dispute in the academic community. More than 97% of climate scientists believe that “global warming exists, and human activities are very likely the main cause of the global warming phenomenon observed in the past half century.”

The Harms of Global Warming and the Responses

The harms of this climate change are also very clear. Increasingly frequent extreme heat, rising sea levels submerging low-altitude areas due to melting glaciers, more frequent heavy rainfall and floods, the spread of infectious diseases into higher latitudes, drought areas becoming drier and more desertified, loss of biodiversity, ecological damage in extremely high latitudes due to melting snow and ice, an increase in epidemics, reduced crop yields, and stronger and more frequent typhoons and tropical cyclones. All of these pose severe harms and threats to the survival of humanity and all living beings on Earth. If the worsening of global warming cannot be stopped in time, humanity will suffer extremely painful natural disasters and induced human-made disasters in the future, and humans may even perish because of it.

Global warming (global warming is the mainstream and key aspect of this round of climate change, and the main subject of discussion in this article, so unless otherwise specified, “global warming” will be used rather than “climate change.” Also, “global warming” not only refers to a natural phenomenon caused by human factors, but also represents a climate crisis that will cause disasters) is mainly caused by human activities, including industrial and agricultural activities as well as various aspects of daily consumption. To curb global warming, industrial and agricultural production and personal consumption must be restricted, reducing production, supply, and use associated with greenhouse gas emissions. This will greatly affect the economic development, employment, quality of life, and social stability of nations and their people. Moreover, curbing global warming requires broad international cooperation, but the impacts of global warming differ across countries, as do their levels of development, industrial structures, and quality of life. Thus, their responses also differ. Therefore, the climate issue is not only a scientific and environmental problem but also a political problem, an economic problem, a human rights problem, a livelihood problem, an international relations problem, and many other important and thorny issues for humanity. Behind these issues are massive conflicts of interest, affecting the rise and fall of nations and peoples, and relating to the livelihood, life, survival, and death of countless people.

In addition, there is also the widespread influence of “climate change denial.” Due to factors such as religion, social trust, the spread and quality of education, values and culture, and most importantly, interests and positions, the forces denying or questioning global warming are very powerful. These include many politicians, social activists, and huge numbers of ordinary people, all holding to climate change denial. The main points of denial are nothing more than: “Global warming is a normal natural variation, not caused by humans or humans have little influence,” “The climate is not necessarily warming, it may even be cooling,” “Global warming is a scam fabricated by some politicians and scientists for power or profit,” etc. (and derived versions like “Global warming will not necessarily lead to disasters,” or “xx disaster is not caused by global warming but has always been a natural phenomenon,” and so on). These doubts can all actually be refuted and negated with large amounts of facts and clear evidence, but belief in these views remains very widespread. (On the fallacies of “climate change denial,” from academic journals to well-known media to experts in various countries, there are clear and credible criticisms. Because of space, they will not be reproduced here one by one. Those interested can consult reliable sources online or offline.)

Thus, both nations and peoples have produced numerous disputes over whether global warming needs to be curbed and how to curb it. These disputes involve interests, values, and more often the intertwining of the two. And as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, China’s related disputes are also very fierce. The impact of global warming on China, the reactions from the government to the public, their influence on policymaking, and the domestic and foreign relations issues reflected in these reactions and disputes are all very complex and sharp, deserving of analysis, discussion, and perhaps some possible suggestions.

First of all, the Chinese government acknowledges the existence of global warming and its real threat to China, and has conducted massive research, analysis, and predictions on this. But regarding how exactly to solve global warming, and how much responsibility to bear in international emission reduction cooperation, there is great controversy with other countries, and China’s own policies are constantly changing.

What is of more analytical and discussion value, however, is the attitude and behavior of the Chinese people (of course here “the people” also includes elites and vested interests).

Among the Chinese people (hereinafter referred to as “the people”), the majority are actually skeptical of or even deny global warming. Their reasons are no more than the same arguments used by denialists in other countries, and their views and questions can similarly be refuted with vast and solid facts and data.

However, these people who hold to climate change denial cannot determine China’s climate policy, and their skepticism has little discussion value in terms of scientific validity itself. What is truly worth discussing is the stance and attitude of the mainstream populace—including both believers and deniers of global warming—toward how China treats global warming, and the values, interests, and even more complex factors reflected behind this.

Among the people, there is no shortage of those who agree with the reality of global warming, especially among the elite groups of Chinese society. Although their scientific literacy is not high, at least compared with those religiously devout “elites” in the United States, they are more able to understand and accept the conclusions reached by science. But this does not mean they have a correct understanding or attitude toward the role and responsibility China should assume in global warming, nor does it mean they are enthusiastic about environmental protection and curbing global warming. On the contrary, their stance is precisely one of strongly resisting global efforts to improve the climate issue, opposing China taking appropriate responsibility and making corresponding sacrifices.

The Rights and Wrongs Concerning “Chai Jing Interviews Ding Zhongli”

This stance and attitude are very typically and centrally reflected in the public’s reaction to former CCTV journalist Chai Jing’s interview with Ding Zhongli, a climate expert at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In the interview, Chai Jing emphasized the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the significant efforts made by developed countries to cut emissions, and advocated addressing global emission reduction and China’s responsibilities in a professional rather than political way. Ding Zhongli, on the other hand, emphasized the struggle over national interests (political factors) behind the division of climate responsibilities, the need for developed countries to bear more responsibility, the idea that China as a developing country should have more space for industrial development, and that the Chinese people have the right to the same per capita emission allowances as citizens of developed countries. Ding also specifically mentioned that developed countries industrialized earlier and had longer periods of unrestricted greenhouse gas emissions, and stressed that China, disregarding the past, only demanded the right to per capita emissions equal to 80% of that of developed countries in the future, which would be sufficient.

On the surface, both Chai Jing and Ding Zhongli appear to have valid points (though those attacking Chai Jing do not believe she had any), and Ding’s words seemed more aligned with the interests of the Chinese people. In particular, Ding’s defense of Chinese people having emission rights equal to those of developed countries—phrased as “Are Chinese people not human?”—made the public feel stirred with nationalistic passion, calling him a “peerless national hero” and a “true expert.” Meanwhile, Chai Jing was seen as a traitor standing on the side of American and foreign interest groups, accused of lacking professional knowledge and disrespecting experts and scholars. She was vilified with slurs such as “public intellectual,” “American lapdog,” “holy whore,” and “traitor.” On platforms like Zhihu, Bilibili, and Weibo, one can find comments about this interview filled with vicious insults and defamation against Chai Jing.

But is the truth really what the audience believes? Was everything Ding Zhongli said the whole truth (and similarly, was everything Chai Jing said the whole truth)? What role should China really play in global emission reduction, and how much responsibility should it bear?

First, what Ding Zhongli said was factual, but only partially so, and clearly selectively presented. Indeed, as a late-industrializing nation, China’s level of economic development, per capita GDP, and standard of living are far below those of Europe and the U.S. For present-day China, economic development, employment, and raising national income are more urgent and tangible than tackling climate issues. Developed countries, with their first-mover advantage and relatively prosperous living conditions, do have greater responsibility and comparatively lighter pressure to cut emissions. This is precisely why developed and developing countries established the consensus of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in international climate negotiations, and why China participates in international cooperation to curb global warming on the basis of this principle.

On the other hand, however, the Chinese public—intentionally or not—has ignored the greater sacrifices borne by developed countries and the necessity for China to make greater efforts. It is true that, per capita, even after reductions, developed countries’ carbon emissions remain higher. Yet, as Chai Jing and the background video pointed out, under the agreements, developed countries would reduce emissions by up to 80% (possibly even 95%), while developing countries would not cut as much, and could reach net-zero emissions later. Ding himself mentioned that developed countries’ emissions would then be 2.3 times those of developing countries, whereas before it had been 7.54 times. These figures show that the absolute cost and relative cost (compared with their original emissions) borne by developed countries far exceed those of developing countries. This means developed countries must make proactive sacrifices, including giving up many industrial achievements already attained, facing higher unemployment among traditional industrial workers, and further disrupting existing social orders.

True, even so, developed countries would still have a per capita emission advantage and a historical debt. But for vested interests to willingly give up such a large portion of their existing and expected gains already constitutes a very considerable sacrifice. While it is right that they should pay more, it is unrealistic to demand that they reduce to the same per capita level as underdeveloped countries. This is like redistribution and taxation: vested interests must indeed surrender some income to subsidize the poor and maintain social fairness, but they cannot be required to reduce their income to the average wage or even minimum wage level. China’s top personal income tax rate is 45%, America’s is 35%, and in some European countries it reaches 75%. Even with a 75% tax, the remaining 25% for the wealthy is still many times greater than the average or minimum wage. Can they be required to reduce down to the average wage? Such complete “equalization of wealth” may be an ideal, but it is neither possible nor desirable in today’s world. Similarly, Bill Gates, even after donating most of his money to charity, still has wealth and consumption far above ordinary people. Must he eat, dress, and live exactly like a common worker or office clerk to be considered perfect?

The carbon emission issue is the same. For developed countries, their industrialization is already very advanced, with high agricultural intensification and per capita output. Although the share of the tertiary sector has risen in recent years, their per capita industrial and agricultural output remains many times higher than that of developing countries. While some of this may come from unjust income (such as colonial accumulation and inequalities created by today’s international division of labor), the mainstream of their achievements still comes from hard work and innovation. Cutting emissions so drastically would bring huge economic and employment shocks. Even with industrial transformation and job resettlement, significant costs remain, and some vested interests will inevitably lose. In fact, such sacrifices have already triggered backlash from stakeholders—from oil companies to ordinary industrial workers—causing unrest within countries (as in the U.S.). Developed countries are already willing to make much greater sacrifices in both total and per capita terms for carbon reduction; must they also be forced to match developing countries’ per capita emissions levels, which are tightly tied to their much lower per capita industrial output and GDP? Is that realistic? Ding himself said dividing the cake is a “huge interest.” Are developed countries’ “interests” blown in by the wind? If developed countries are willing to make such concessions, should China and other developing countries not also make corresponding concessions?

Some Chinese may know this deep down but still insist on absolute equality, and may accuse my words of siding with the rich, worrying about vested interests, or being a “traitor” standing with foreigners. But think: in China’s domestic emission reduction efforts, should Shanghai’s per capita emissions be cut down to Qinghai’s level to be fair (even though Shanghai is more affected by global warming and should contribute more)? Should Zhengzhou city’s per capita emissions be reduced to match the province’s rural areas? Even if developed regions and major cities grew partly by exploiting privileges and consuming more resources, is it fair to forcibly impose one standard of emissions? Would that benefit China’s overall development, including its underdeveloped regions? Everyone knows China’s wealth gap is huge, but in future redistribution, can or should China’s top elites and ordinary white-collar workers have the same income, white-collar workers equal to farmers, everyone exactly the same?

If that were done, it would fit the principle of complete equality (even retroactively) advocated by Ding and his supporters. This is the ideal image of a utopian society, but in reality it is impossible. Many Ding supporters on platforms like Zhihu are themselves somewhat educated and above average income. Do they truly support such “equalization of wealth”? Do graduates of elite universities support having the same income as Foxconn assembly line workers (even when the latter often sweat more and come from poorer families more in need of compensatory welfare)? In terms of per capita emissions, are well-off Chinese willing to reduce their own industrial and consumer goods–related emissions down to the level of ordinary people? If their past consumption-based emissions were 10 times those of poor households, are they willing to reduce to twice as much through lower consumption?

So, Ding’s position, seen in a completely idealized light, is indeed correct, but it is impossible to realize and unreasonable in practice. Humanity has not reached the conditions required for such absolute equality. Supporters themselves cannot equalize with those beneath them. Even within China, per capita emissions differ vastly by region. What right, then, is there to demand developed and developing countries have identical per capita emission levels?

Developed countries drastically cutting emissions but still remaining higher per capita, developing countries cutting less both absolutely and relatively but still remaining lower, and the per capita gap narrowing greatly, with both sides reducing emissions under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities to curb global warming—that is already the best possible solution at present.

The Fallacies of Ding Zhongli

In addition, Ding mentioned in the interview that as a geologist, he believed human activity had little impact on temperature, and later even said it cannot be absolutely certain that global warming is caused by human activity, and raised the idea that “is there really such a thing as mainstream science?” This was quite misleading. His words resembled those of climate change denialists. Originally, I did not intend to comment in detail on the long-debunked claims of climate denialism, but since Ding’s words are raised here, they must be judged specifically.

Indeed, on the scale of geological time, a few decades or centuries of warming is not unique (the scientific community has shown natural cycles of tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of years, the “Milankovitch cycles”), and today’s warming is but a tiny fluctuation in Earth’s extremely long history. The Earth has had periods where the average temperature was more than 10°C higher than now. But such “tiny” fluctuations from a macro-historical perspective have devastating impacts on humanity today. And this time it is not natural but man-made, not irresistible but preventable. For humans, fluctuations on the scale of tens of thousands or millions of years must and can be ignored. Just as the Sun will die in billions of years and Earth with it, this does not mean we should stop building, developing, or fighting natural disasters and climate problems. In normal conditions, humanity still has thousands, tens of thousands, even millions of years left to live. Should we strive to extend survival and make life better for future generations, or give up and ignore looming destruction, condemning billions to suffering and death? By a simpler analogy: everyone will die, but does that mean we should stop treating illnesses or striving to live longer once we are born?

Furthermore, Ding’s words also subconsciously (let’s assume not deliberately) ignore the relationship between constants and variables. The warming value caused by human greenhouse gas emissions is indeed a small proportion of Earth’s total temperature, but that small increase is fatal. Like the human body: normal temperature is 36–37°C, fever is 38–39°C, severe at 42°C. The increase seems small, but it is enough to cause serious illness. Above 40°C may cause fainting, 42°C can cause death in hours. The earlier 36°C posed no problem, but the extra 6°C is deadly. Climate works the same: the added increase is a small proportion but enough to destroy ecosystems and habitability, even leading to extinction. (Similarly with sea-level rise: though Earth’s altitude differences span nearly 20,000 meters, just a few meters’ rise can submerge major cities; 15 meters would drown the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas. The rise is tiny compared to total altitude variation, but devastating in effect.)

As for “climate change cannot be absolutely proven to be caused by humans,” this is just exploiting scientific and logical loopholes. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence that human activity is the main cause, logic alone rebuts it. Scientific theories are never “100% certain,” but many can be treated as effectively certain. Geology itself, Ding’s field, is built on inference from evidence, not direct observation of ancient eras. Yet such inferences produce valid, valuable results. Science must “boldly hypothesize, carefully verify.” Reports avoid absolute language for rigor, but recent reports explicitly state human activity as the main cause of current warming, to prevent deniers from exploiting loopholes.

Moreover, even if not 100% certain, if 90% certain, should we not act? Like a medical diagnosis: even “confirmed” cases may later be overturned, but does that mean diagnosis and treatment are unnecessary? Or surgery: without it, 90% chance of death within a year, 10% chance of recovery; with it, severe pain and 10% risk of failure. Should one do it? Individually one may refuse, but for humanity as a whole, no one has the right to refuse action on behalf of all.

As for “is there really a mainstream in science,” it sounds scientific but is sophistry. Science is not about numbers deciding truth. But probability is part of science, and consensus emerges when a vast majority of experts agree. When 95% of scientists conclude climate change is man-made and extremely harmful, should we side with the 5%? If the 95% were coerced or baseless and the 5% free and well-grounded, then yes, but the opposite is true. The vast majority of climate scientists are free, well-trained, and provide robust evidence, with countless reports and papers. The small minority often have dubious ties—to oil companies, politics, or denialist agendas—and many of them don’t even outright deny warming, but hedge by saying it “cannot be absolutely certain.” So, whom should we believe? (By that logic, since most Chinese deny climate change and supported Ding after Chai’s interview, does that make them right? Clearly not—this is just muddying the waters.)

As for Chai Jing, of course her scientific literacy and expertise cannot match Ding Zhongli’s. Her other work on environmental issues has also exposed gaps in her knowledge and rigor. For instance, her documentary Under the Dome was criticized for errors, including by noted science writer Fang Zhouzi. But mistakes aside, she did not deliberately mislead nor make grave errors. As a journalist, her knowledge was sufficient to conduct interviews, her questions were factual and necessary. Especially as Ding stressed China’s stance of politics and interests, her counterbalancing with human common interests and depoliticized professionalism was valuable. Similar “oppositions” in the interview made for a fuller truth, more like a debate. If the interview had only agreement, it would have failed. She was a qualified journalist, and the program was competent. Her past work also shows her to be someone concerned for her country and people. We may critique her errors, but not smear her with conspiracies.

(Ironically, in recent years China has pledged a “carbon neutrality” plan, essentially acknowledging the international mainstream’s correctness on climate issues and solutions—contrary to Ding’s past views. Yet now, online, people both support carbon neutrality (or at least not oppose it publicly) and still strongly support Ding’s statements—even though his remarks predate China’s carbon neutrality pledge. This shows they do not even understand the basic facts, nor think independently. They have no grasp of what carbon neutrality policy entails or what Ding actually said. They have only positions, not principles—and positions can turn 180 degrees at any time. They claim to revere science, yet lack even basic scientific literacy or spirit.)

The Interpretations, Reactions, and Paradoxes of the Chinese People Toward Climate Issues and Related Western Criticisms

The Chinese public does not only display one-sided frenzy in the case of Chai Jing’s interview with Ding Zhongli; in fact, whenever climate change is involved, especially in hot events, the reaction is almost always the same. For example, a foreign media report once stated: “Every time a Chinese person eats a piece of meat, the Amazon releases a puff of smoke,” to illustrate the impact of China’s meat consumption on global warming. This triggered an uproar and extreme anger among Chinese netizens. “Westerners/Americans/Europeans not allowing Chinese people to eat meat” became the dominant impression of Western—and global—environmentalism among the Chinese public, and an important reason for their intense dislike of the West, especially of Western leftists (the so-called “white left”).

“Chinese people eating meat, the Amazon emits smoke” was, of course, an exaggerated depiction and publicity, but behind this phrase lies an objective fact: the large consumption of meat by Chinese people contributes to global warming. The “butterfly effect” is well known, and the impact of Chinese consumption of Brazilian beef on the Amazon rainforest and on global warming is far more direct and significant than the usual butterfly effect. This was not a slander or persecution specifically targeting the Chinese. First, the phrase only described a phenomenon and fact; it did not say Chinese people must not eat meat, much less use force to stop them. Second, similar criticisms are made globally, and even more so toward the West itself. In fact, environmental organizations have long issued broader, more persistent criticism of the meat-heavy diets of Western nations, especially Americans, and have launched various campaigns to reduce meat consumption among Western populations.

The phrase “the West not allowing Chinese people to eat meat” went viral on major social platforms. Together with the flood of insults toward Chai Jing and the conspiracy-theory interpretations of climate issues, it reflects how the Chinese public is immersed in unjustified anger, the loss of empathy, responsibility, and a sense of obligation, the sway of narrow nationalism, and the spread of anti-intellectualism, selfishness, and social Darwinist thinking.

China’s participation in emission reduction and efforts to curb global warming is both in its own interest and an international obligation. The concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind” is not empty talk; regardless of the subjective intent behind proposing it, in reality humanity is indeed increasingly interconnected, mutually influencing, and inseparable—and climate issues especially so. China should certainly give priority to its national interests, but it should also take into account the interests of other countries and the common interests of the world. On carbon emissions, China bears responsibilities and obligations from both the government and the public. Even if individuals are unwilling to proactively shoulder such obligations, they should not react with near-hysterical opposition.

However, many Chinese people completely disregard international obligations and stand entirely from the perspective of their own country—or themselves—going so far as to harm others for self-gain or to allow global climate cooperation to collapse, dragging everyone down together. Earlier, I used the analogy that within China, regions at different levels of development cannot have identical carbon standards, to explain the difference between developed and developing countries. But in the eyes of many Chinese, domestic differences are China’s internal affairs; when it comes to foreign countries, however, China must insist on securing advantages. If China were to bear relatively greater costs and stricter obligations than other countries, that would be a “loss.” Similarly, they do not admire or follow the West’s genuine efforts at environmental protection or the sacrifices made by its people, but instead mock them, arguing that China should seize the chance to surpass the West by pushing industrial development forward without regard for climate constraints while the West holds itself back for environmental reasons.

In their view, everything is a struggle, a zero-sum game. There is no room for compromise or sympathy. Victory in international rivalry comes only by being unreasonable, only telling one side of the story, using all means necessary, in order to defend the interests of their nation and people (especially their own interests).

From this premise, it is natural for them to treat the West’s calls for China to engage with climate issues as nothing but a pretext to suppress China. Whenever Western governments, media, or NGOs raise criticisms of China’s climate and environmental problems, they respond reflexively with hostility. They interpret Western pressure on environmental issues as attempts to sabotage China’s economy, derail its industrialization and modernization, suppress its rise and national rejuvenation, prevent its people—especially workers and farmers—from escaping poverty and achieving prosperity, and “smash the rice bowls” of Chinese citizens. As a result, they push away responsibility for China’s role in global warming, even downplaying or denying other environmental problems. Then, they counterattack by criticizing Western environmental shortcomings or pointing out the West’s neglect of other countries’ environmental issues, thereby seeking to weaken the West’s discursive power and defend China.

This confrontational reaction is unreasonable, unnecessary, and ultimately harmful to both others and themselves. Admittedly, the world has not achieved universal harmony and remains a jungle of fierce competition among nations. China, with its history of humiliation and suffering and still in its developing stage, is justified in safeguarding national interests. When it comes to environmental issues, these cannot be purely environmental—they inevitably involve struggles over national interests. But in defending national interests, we must base ourselves on right and wrong, follow international rules, and argue on reasonable grounds, not muddle truth and falsehood or engage in reckless sophistry. Where China is in the right, it must firmly defend itself; where it is in the wrong, it must have the courage to assume responsibility.

What China Should Not Do and Should Do Regarding Climate Issues

Climate issues concern the shared interests of China and the world. China should bear responsibility. As the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide in total, China should undoubtedly assume greater obligations in curbing global warming than most countries. While demanding that developed nations such as the U.S. make greater per capita contributions and provide China with technology and financial assistance, China must also be willing to compromise and show sincerity by shouldering its own share of responsibility.

As for the impacts of emission reduction, energy conservation, and environmental policies on livelihoods—especially the employment and income of ordinary workers and farmers—these should be addressed through China’s own domestic measures: industrial transformation and upgrading, creating new jobs, reforming distribution mechanisms, improving treatment of workers and farmers, and abolishing unfair and harmful policies and institutions. In fact, the damage done by China’s various unfair systems and policies to the interests of workers and farmers far exceeds the impact of international responsibilities and carbon reduction (if the latter’s impact is 1, the former’s is 10). Ding Zhongli and his supporters often invoke lofty reasons of economy, employment, and living standards to defend carbon emissions, but in reality, most of the benefits of emissions in industry and agriculture go to elites and vested interest groups, while ordinary people only get leftovers. Meanwhile, common people bear more of the environmental costs, whereas the wealthy and powerful can evade pollution and climate disasters—or simply emigrate to safe places. Where can ordinary people flee? What Ding and others defend are merely the selfish interests of the privileged, while throwing ordinary people scraps. Even without changing the system, if social policies and distribution mechanisms were even partially improved—if vested interests, especially elites, yielded some share of their gains (far smaller in proportion than the carbon cuts demanded of developed countries)—ordinary people would gain much more than what they now get from producing emissions and pollution.

China’s future development, the improvement of people’s livelihoods, and the nation’s rejuvenation cannot and should not be achieved by destroying China’s own or the world’s ecological environment and causing environmental disasters. Instead, it must come through the establishment and improvement of democracy, rule of law, and civil society, the contributions of labor, and the aid of technological development. If China only thinks of exploiting the climate crisis and the West’s eagerness to cut emissions for selfish gain, it may reap short-term benefits, but in the long run it will only lose moral standing on the international stage, be despised and isolated by nations—especially civilized, developed ones—and ultimately “find itself with few allies and even relatives turning away,” cutting itself off from the global mainstream and future trends, and in the end backfiring on itself. How then can there be national rise or people’s happiness? As for the fact that many developed countries once developed through polluting and emitting, of course they should be condemned and required to compensate and help latecomer nations—but China should not repeat their harmful actions. Colonial expansion, once considered legitimate and a source of prosperity, should not be imitated in modern times. Japan’s rationale for invading Korea and China was, “If Britain, France, the U.S., and the Netherlands can, why can’t we?”—and it brought immense disaster to the world, especially China. Similarly, it may be understandable for China to seek revenge against past aggressors, but to harm weaker, innocent nations and peoples after suffering itself—what logic is that?

On the other hand, China should also defend its legitimate interests in emission reduction, demanding that other countries fulfill their obligations as well, insisting on reciprocity (though reciprocity does not mean absolute equivalence without conditions). Under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” China can rightly require developed countries to make both relatively and absolutely greater efforts, and to provide and transfer capital, technology, models, and experience to help China cut emissions at the lowest economic and social cost. Developed countries have mature environmental protection experience and technology, which should be unconditionally shared with China, along with technical personnel sent to assist implementation. Adjustments can be made to suit China’s conditions, but the baseline should be to “adopt and use,” taking shortcuts rather than detours. Furthermore, for the additional costs China bears relative to developed countries in reducing emissions, it has the right to demand compensation or concessions. For instance, if restricting traditional energy and industry damages China’s economy and disadvantages it in global trade, China can demand recompense or policy concessions from developed countries—or refuse to abandon certain industries.

China also has the right to demand corresponding reductions from other countries with both high total and per capita carbon emissions. Middle Eastern oil producers and Russia, for example, have extremely high per capita emissions and massive totals. Their per capita obligations are actually greater than China’s. Especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other oil states, with extravagant lifestyles and unrestrained consumption, living off unearned wealth, should bear costs far above the world average. Meanwhile, India, though its current emissions are below China’s, has a faster growth rate. India’s role compared with China is similar to China’s compared with the U.S. Thus, the reciprocal responsibility framework between China and the U.S. should also apply between China and India. If Middle Eastern oil states, Russia, or India fail to fulfill obligations, China may take countermeasures.

Moreover, China once paid a huge price by implementing the “family planning” policy, reducing its births by hundreds of millions over three decades, with lasting effects on population numbers and birth rates. This objectively contributed to carbon reduction (fewer people means lower total emissions). Therefore, China can justifiably claim a greater per capita emission allowance and demand compensation from higher-birthrate countries.

Additionally, although China is the largest emitter in production terms, many of its high-carbon products are exported abroad. Thus, the carbon embedded in China’s exports should be reasonably accounted for and shared between China and importing countries, with joint carbon taxes and shared reduction efforts from production to consumption.

At present, China has pledged “carbon neutrality” and is implementing it, which on the whole is a positive direction. But the specific actions and impacts are still hard to predict (though some signs are visible). How China will handle the related economic, livelihood, human rights, environmental, and international relations issues, especially the conflicts of interest among different groups, remains a key area to watch and study. This concerns the interests and even life or death of millions.

From the Chinese Public’s Mockery of Greta Thunberg to an Examination of Mindsets and Values

In recent years, Sweden’s “environmental girl” Greta Thunberg (hereinafter referred to as “Greta,” or simply “she”) became a world-renowned figure for her active participation in social movements concerning climate issues. In calling for curbing global warming, she has often displayed various radical, bold, and avant-garde words and actions, at times appearing childish and obsessive. As a result, she has been ridiculed and mocked by some people around the world, including some Chinese (ranging from ordinary citizens to political figures like Trump).

Although both in China and abroad there has been ridicule and attacks against her, they are not exactly the same. In foreign countries—especially in developed Western countries—although some look down on her or even hurl insults, a considerable number of people express support and understanding. In China, by contrast, there are almost no voices supporting her (or if there are, they remain silent?), and the entire internet overwhelmingly ridicules and attacks her. The intensity and vehemence of the Chinese public’s insults also seem far greater than overseas; the hatred and contempt for her are particularly strong, and they vividly reflect certain problems concerning the Chinese public and Chinese society.

These sneers and attacks can roughly be divided into the following categories: (1) believing she is being used, a political tool of interest groups or politicians; (2) believing she knows nothing and is making a foolish fuss; (3) believing she has mental illness—paranoia, delusions, schizophrenia—and that her related behaviors are “episodes”; (4) believing she is hypocritical and affected, not practicing environmentalism herself while demanding it of others; (5) believing she does not understand the hardships of people’s livelihoods, especially in developing countries, and that disregarding economic and livelihood issues for the sake of environmental protection is “let them eat meat gruel.” Of course, the above merely summarizes these taunts; the actual insults are far more varied and, in expression, much harsher and more cutting than what I have listed.

First it must be stated that the problem she is calling attention to and seeking to solve—global warming—does truly exist, and the situation is quite serious. Countries have indeed, for various objective or subjective reasons, failed to forcefully advance measures to curb global warming. Therefore, her advocacy is necessary. Of course, she also has many problems and shortcomings, which will be mentioned later. This is the premise for commenting on matters concerning her (including others’ reactions to her and her words and actions).

First, regarding the so-called “being used”: taken purely as “being used,” it is indeed not something glorious. However, if one considers the various backgrounds and subjective and objective factors behind such “being used,” especially the actual impact, it is not necessarily a purely bad thing—at times it can even be good. From ancient times to the present, how many great undertakings have been accomplished amid people using and being used, mutually using one another (of course, much filth has likewise arisen in this way). During the American War of Independence, the United States received strong support from France. France certainly aimed to check Britain, but for America’s independence this was almost entirely beneficial, forging centuries of friendship between the U.S. and France. Sun Yat-sen, back then, was supported and protected by certain great powers including Japan—these powers certainly sought to cultivate agents in China and weaken the Qing regime. Yet this facilitated the great victory of the Xinhai Revolution, and Sun did not thereby become a proxy for great powers; instead, he promoted China’s democratic prosperity and its struggle for equal status in the international arena.

Today, the Chinese public’s recoil at the phrase “being used” is largely the result of certain education and guidance. The Chinese public is extremely sensitive to and averse—even hateful—toward “interest groups,” NGOs, and foreign intervention. In fact, in the operations of modern society, the influence of interest groups is omnipresent; some wear labels and some do not, and those without public labels are even more likely to operate behind closed doors. National interests certainly must be safeguarded, and foreign forces certainly have their various selfish aims; yet under certain specific circumstances and conditions, their positive effects far outweigh the negative.

Greta is, to some extent, being used; however, what she advocates is worth attention. Her cooperation with various actors, including political forces from different countries tied to interests or values, is voluntary, and the impact is positive. On the other hand, those who oppose curbing global warming for reasons of interest and values are also—indeed, even more so—backed by interest groups. Trump, who denied climate change and human causes, received strong support from traditional energy industries in the U.S. Many other politicians, scholars (including a small number of scientists), and media figures who deny or doubt global warming have been exposed as receiving donations and contributions from various stakeholders.

Of course, as a public figure, people have the right to evaluate her thus; from a certain angle, it is understandable to say she is being used, a tool. But to actually use this to negate her and her advocacy would be truly childish—or foolish.

Second, those who say she is ignorant and making a fuss are being one-sided—or, in most cases, have not learned much about her or about climate issues. She indeed lacks a comprehensive understanding of human society and the world as a whole, and seems to know little about—or does not care about—the negative impacts of carbon-reduction policies. She lacks comprehensive general knowledge in politics, economics, ideology, and international relations, let alone mastery. However, when it comes to climate issues, her positions are supported by objective facts and by research widely recognized by the scientific community, not made-up nonsense. On climate, she has said, “Don’t listen to me; listen to the scientists.” This is far more scientifically literate than those who oppose her.

Third, some say she has mental illness and cite many of her words and actions as evidence. First, she has indeed been diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and selective mutism—psychiatric conditions that differ from what people commonly understand as severe mental illness—and these conditions do not affect the truth or necessity of her advocacy. As for claiming she has other symptoms such as paranoia, delusions, or mania: if her behaviors count as such illnesses, then from ancient times to the present, countless politicians and activists would also be “ill.” The reason people think she is ill while those others are not is simply that she is an ordinary citizen, that she focuses on issues most people do not deem worthy of such attention and zeal, and that she is different from and at odds with traditional and some popular views. This is prejudice.

In the first half of the 19th century, a Hungarian doctor, Ignaz Semmelweis, insisted that doctors who did not wash their hands spread germs that killed women in childbirth, forcefully demanded handwashing before procedures, and called colleagues who did not wash “killers.” He became extreme and eccentric, was beaten, committed to an asylum, and died there. Later, science confirmed he was right, and handwashing became the primary method to prevent infections in hospitals. His “extremity and eccentricity” likely stemmed from the pain of holding to truth yet being misunderstood, and helplessly watching preventable deaths. Semmelweis was treated as mentally ill without research then confirming his claims; Greta’s climate claims have already been amply confirmed. She is rather extreme—calling it “obsessive” is not wrong—but that is only because she is overly urgent and disregards practical constraints. If we must label such people mentally ill, then it is the public that appears paranoid, extreme, and intolerant of dissent.

Fourth, some say she is hypocritical and does not practice what she preaches. In fact, she has. She refuses to fly and traveled by sailboat, and she maintains a vegetarian diet. Of course, this has also drawn criticism—for example, some claim the total emissions from her sailing arrangements exceeded those from flying alone. Chinese netizens also deride her by comparing her unfavorably to domestic youth who “actively plant trees.” Such accusations are hardly novel—especially in China. During the 1989 student movement, some student leaders were accused of “squandering overseas donations on lavish meals”; Fang Fang, who documented Wuhan’s COVID outbreak, was accused of failing to volunteer for epidemic control and of using privilege to have police escort relatives to the airport, and so on.

I do not believe these critics cannot distinguish priorities; I rather believe they deliberately nitpick. Still, let me rebut this fallacy directly. Practicing what one preaches is of course best, but we must also respect division of labor and roles. For those who play important roles on certain issues, we should show appropriate tolerance. Their identities often mean they need to obtain and use more resources; otherwise, they cannot maximize their impact. Moreover, in a society broadly lacking rule of law and justice, demanding perfection from those who speak out—attacking them for minor improprieties that most people commit—will only make reality worse and silence more voices. As for those who boast of “tree-planting,” how many have actually planted trees with their own hands? Were they participating in quasi-compulsory activities, or did they spend their own money to plant trees voluntarily?

Fifth, the claim that she does not understand the hardships and development needs of people in developing countries is, in fact, a valid criticism—though the motives of those making it are not necessarily a genuine cry for the suffering in developing countries. Her biggest problem is indeed her failure to balance economy and environment, the present and the long term. This is her limitation and a shortfall in her knowledge and vision. Yet nobody seems to have engaged her in sincere dialogue or explained these issues to her through various channels (for example, writing open letters or even meeting her), choosing instead to ridicule and attack in a snide tone. Those who criticize her—including Putin, idolized by Chinese social-Darwinists for similar reasons—hardly care about people’s hardships, nor are they willing to return their ill-gotten gains to those suffering. Moreover, if climate warming is not addressed and countries are allowed to expand industry and agriculture and emit more CO₂, developing countries and backward regions will often suffer even greater losses than if they did not develop industry and agriculture—and locals may lose their homelands entirely in coming decades or centuries. The myriad negative consequences of global warming will be borne most by the weakest, especially in countries lacking democracy, rule of law, and justice.

In short, although she has many shortcomings, her intentions are sincere, what she calls for is worthy of attention, and her deeds have positive significance—she represents hope for humanity in a new era. By contrast, if the Chinese who sneer at her possessed her persistence, courage, determination, and idealism, many of China’s social problems could be noticed and solved, and Chinese society would be renewed. A hundred years ago, thirty years ago, there were such people in China, and not a few. But due to the encirclement and harm by internal and external enemies, China today has been left with only cynically social-Darwinized, exquisitely self-interested individuals. Not only do these people refuse to pursue justice and sacrifice for the people, they also “buzz around” the flaws and wounds of true fighters, mistaking themselves as clever.

To those who jeer at Greta, I offer them a line from Lu Xun: “In a hopeless nation there must be many heroes who only glare at children. Cowards, the lot of them!”

It is not only toward her that the Chinese public sneers; they also scoff at international environmental organizations, movements, and related calls and proposals (as for the domestic sphere, the earlier-mentioned torrent of insults against Chai Jing is an example. It is just that voices calling attention to climate change at home are dwindling, leaving them with no targets). As for their reasons, they are nothing more than the above. But as I have already rebutted one by one, most of their criticisms do not hold water.

So why do they keep criticizing like this? This relates to the environment they inhabit and to the values and ways of thinking they hold—or have been molded into.

They often claim Western environmentalists are hypocrites with double standards. But the facts are not so. While a few may be two-faced, most environmental supporters do practice low-carbon principles. In Western Europe and America, environmentalists and the mainstream left explicitly support, in elections, those who implement emission-reduction policies (including carbon taxes that affect their own pocketbooks; other environmental policies also commonly carry certain negative impacts on economy, income, and quality of life). They also strive to reduce energy and carbon use in consumption, travel, and diet. This requires overcoming many daily desires: convenience, comfort, nutrition, and image. For example, using public transit or walking instead of driving—how much comfort and convenience does that sacrifice? Eating less mouth-watering meat—how much appetite does that restrain? How much self-control does it take to “not eat the meat already at one’s lips”? Wearing second-hand clothing or not replacing clothes frequently may seem trivial, but it still changes one’s lifestyle—and it is easier to go from frugality to luxury than the reverse. Most importantly, they are willing to pay carbon and other environmental taxes, and they support public spending to curb global warming and prevent climate disasters. From bearing economic costs to lifestyle costs, they make many voluntary sacrifices. Is that not enough? Can that not move the Chinese?

It truly cannot. On the one hand, many Chinese do not know any of this; they see only the marches and appeals, not the sacrifices. More disgustingly, many know of these sacrifices yet are neither moved nor willing to change themselves or their country to follow suit. Some even know the facts but refuse to acknowledge them.

This is because they have lived too long in China’s harsh jungle-like society and have lost proactive, benevolent empathy and a sense of responsibility. They think (the following simulates their stance): You are disciplined and self-sacrificing—that’s your business, self-inflicted; what has it to do with me? It wasn’t I who asked you to sacrifice. You want others to bear costs with you? That interferes with our freedom. Doesn’t the West value freedom most? (Using your spear against your shield.) How about you first fix your own country’s xx (indeed, this trope exists worldwide). What, you want to force us to suffer with you (even without coercion; if you truly had the power to coerce, they would not talk like this, nor dare to)? Is this moral blackmail? Your economies are so strong and you industrialized so early—shouldn’t you be the ones to pay more? What, I’m a vested interest too, an early beneficiary of industrialization? That is the fruit of our own hard struggle, unlike your wealth from colonial plunder (oh—plundering one’s own people doesn’t count as colonial plunder? Is that not even more shameless?). You cry with passion and sincerity? Merely self-indulgent emotion. Consider the bigger picture? What is this “bigger picture”—can it be eaten? And why don’t you consider the bigger picture? One, two, three, four, five—look at your behavior; aren’t you even less considerate of the bigger picture? And you still have the face to lecture us? …

The above is not my imagination; you can see it on platforms everywhere. The wording may differ, but the meaning is the same. Why are their hearts so cold and vicious? It is the result of environment shaping character and character reacting back on environment. In a country like China, without democracy or rule of law and full of injustice, only by setting aside empathy and warmth (at least when major interests are at stake) can one survive—and thrive. The kind are bullied. This is not to say people are psychopathic and deliberately bully the good; rather, the kind are easier to talk down, to make concede, to shake. In fierce competition with a fixed pie, and with evildoers too risky to offend, the only option is to squeeze the decent and bully the honest. On major interests, they will not take the initiative to compromise; only by tearing and biting can they live. Voluntarily giving up interests violates the value reflexes—and even physiological reflexes—they have developed in such a harsh environment.

Reason, too, is not used to seek truth but as a tool to defend interests selectively. They invoke reason when it benefits them; when it does not, they deny morality and sophistrize. Moral restraint is seen as a weapon to attack others and as shackles on themselves. Those who “talk morality” pay the higher price. Anyone who asks others to sacrifice—even if making sense—will be mobbed if they lack power and be told to sacrifice more. Even if they have already sacrificed, people will demand more, nitpicking their flaws to criticize. When such a person dies after bearing costs and sacrifices, they may receive a few words of praise, but that’s all. Over 99% will not follow; seeing the tragic end, they will be even less inclined to sacrifice, to practice what they preach, to lead by example.

In China, there is indeed pervasive reasonable and unreasonable “moral blackmail.” Only by denying wrongdoing—or denying moral standards altogether—can one avoid being blackmailed. “Considering the bigger picture” is indeed widely used in China to suppress individual rights protection, and often the “bigger picture” is neither just nor truly the big picture, but the illegal private interests of the powerful. Grand righteous banners are often just fig leaves for private schemers, making their evil deeds easier to hide—more hateful than openly bad actors. As a result, there is no sense of community—or community is maintained only by coercion, not by consent. In a society where all are self-serving, whoever bears more suffers a loss; the selfless merely tailor clothes for others, receiving nothing but a few words of praise (if even that). Who would willingly shoulder their share of responsibility for the whole—especially when others don’t?

Compassion and empathy are scarce—or selectively deployed—among the Chinese public. This, too, is the outcome of the vicious cycle between environment and individuals. In a jungle society, compassion means softheartedness; standing in the opponent’s shoes dulls one’s resolve to win zero-sum contests, leading to being duped, hesitating, compromising, and conceding—only to be taken advantage of and devoured. One may show empathy to others—especially competitors—but they may not reciprocate. When compassion is not mutual or reciprocal, the compassionate side is often defeated by the ruthless. If one has compassion and empathy but pays no actual cost, such compassion is hypocrisy; even if one pays some costs, in a harsh environment it may not be rewarded and may invite vengeance—“a peck returned with a bushel of hatred.” Better to be cold and unsympathetic from the start. When everyone thinks this way, society grows ever more cruel and indifferent; those with compassion suffer more, thus creating a society of universal villainy. Then everyone loses compassion and empathy—or withholds it from anyone but their dearest—refusing to understand others, imputing malice, treating others harshly. Humanity withers; bestiality returns. How, then, can one expect much sincere communication, humanitarian understanding, or compromise based on facts?

As for admitting error and self-reflection, these are hardly virtues in China. There, asking someone to reflect is the victor’s condescending reproach of the vanquished, the strong’s oppression of the weak—not tender concern. If you reflect, others will not necessarily forgive you; instead, they will think you truly are at fault and demand greater costs and concessions. To admit error—or even guilt—is worse: confess certain positions or actions were wrong, and the other side will seize upon your admission to press you step by step, making you lose the debate and pay more. They will righteously think: since you yourself admitted error, isn’t it right for me to treat you this way? As for mutual admissions and forgiveness—if power is equal and no major interests are at stake, perhaps; but on matters touching core interests, would that not be foolish?

When faced with environmental advocacy, the Chinese public also shows strong reactance. As in the earlier case of the criticism (not even addressed directly to Chinese) that “when Chinese eat meat, the Amazon smokes,” Chinese netizens were furious; some said they would eat meat precisely to infuriate others. In Chai Jing’s interview with Ding Zhongli, when she said global warming has already caused so many disasters and that a carbon-reduction agreement must be reached quickly, the scrolling comments read: “Drag it out; don’t sign; let’s see who caves first.” After she earnestly spoke about protecting the environment, the comment area was full of “She’s panicking, she’s panicking.” Beyond environmental issues, it is similar with animal protection: when someone on Zhihu advocated the importance of animal protection legislation, others posted photos of dog meat—some of entire roasted dogs. After Shenzhen legislated to ban dog meat, some claimed they would go there specifically to eat dog meat and drink alcohol.

This reactance also stems from a harsh environment—especially toxic interpersonal relations and educational models. Chinese school, family, and social “education” (not only formal education, but all guidance, preaching, and disciplining behaviors) is full of coercion—even violence (including soft violence). It does not persuade with reason but forces submission through intimidation. Education is often not about clarifying right and wrong, but about compulsory indoctrination and forced acknowledgment—accepting the right and the wrong alike; not patient guidance but humiliation and mockery; not sincere enlightenment and leading to goodness, but deriving pleasure and superiority from scolding. Thus are produced both obedient slaves and rebellious mobs—or more often a combination of compliant subjects and mobs (plus the ignorant): bowing to the powerful, accepting and supporting wrongs; yet toward the weak or those without coercive power, behaving perversely and violently, deliberately reacting against, rejecting and resisting even what is right (and even doing the opposite to provoke). They cannot distinguish between kind advice and malicious criticism. Global climate negotiations aim to protect humanity—including their own homes—yet they treat them as a stage for stubborn contests of “who caves first.” This, too, arises from the domestic environment: in life, especially in interest struggles, they often play this “who caves first” game. As for compromise? Only power and circumstance can make them compromise; nothing is about reason—only strength.

As for being moved by a sense of justice, grievance, or responsibility—this will not earn respect; instead, it exposes a soft spot to be poked. They heap ridicule and taunts until you are enraged or numb. Some do this out of stupidity and misunderstanding; others, out of interest and more insidious motives. They know such people pose a more subversive threat, capable of undermining the order and distribution of interests built on lies and violence. They fear those who expose lies and tell the truth. Even if they feel a twinge of admiration, they will not show mercy—for to do so might bring disaster upon themselves. Thus their hostility and hatred toward the just and sincere only intensify. They befriend petty villains and treat righteous people as enemies—that becomes their “reasonable” stance. In such circumstances, petty villains multiply while the righteous diminish—until there are no righteous at all, only villains.

As for compatriots who think and act in these ways, one can only say they are both pitiable and hateful. They have not lived in a fair, honest, empathetic, tolerant environment, but in a society full of injustice, lies, cold cruelty, and zero-sum struggle. Such a society inevitably molds them thus; only thus can they survive and profit. Over time, it becomes culture and inertia, and they react this way reflexively to every issue. As for persuading them toward goodness, feasibility is of course currently nil; indeed, if some people truly tried to live virtuously in China, it would harm them—the less virtuous would divide up their interests and even their very persons.

But this does not mean they are entirely passive in speaking and acting thus; on the contrary, many are highly proactive—especially vested interests. They know right from wrong, but they know even better how to maximize their own interests. As for being “forced by circumstances”: all humans (indeed all animals) worldwide are products of circumstance. China’s harsh environment explains the viciousness of their words and deeds, but it does not excuse them. So long as one is a vested interest, whose gains exceed losses, innocence does not apply.

Of course, does that mean foreigners and foreign countries lack such social and human ugliness? Of course not. But at least in some countries and among some people, after the baptism of democracy and rule of law, enlightenment, civil society, and freedom of speech, these uglinesses have been greatly reduced. And where some groups confront each other in those countries, at least part of their reasons stand on solid ground. The Chinese public’s reactance and antagonism—on what, exactly, are they based?

It should also be noted that the vices of the Chinese public described and analyzed above do not mean they are committing evils at every moment, in every matter. At least some of them do have a kind and reasonable side and are not without tolerance and mutual understanding in everyday or minor matters. But once major interests are involved, their fangs are bared. There are relatively good and relatively bad people in every Chinese stratum, but vested interests are relatively worse and more insidious and reap more gains. Overall, the more power, connections, and money one has, the worse one tends to be—though there are exceptions, their proportion is quite low. And even these exceptions often obtain vested interests through structurally unjust, illegal gains. As for the people—especially the lower classes—although there are indeed some heinous individuals, there are also the kind and simple (or those forced to be so). Their stubborn cunning more often stems from necessity, and even when they exploit loopholes and lie to gain some benefits, overall they are still the dispossessed—the insulted and the injured. Except for those who commit unforgivable crimes, the lower classes deserve sympathy and understanding to varying degrees.

Is it really so necessary and urgent to curb global warming?

Some Chinese people also understand that global warming is truly happening, but they cannot comprehend the radicalism and urgency of Western countries, especially their environmentalists. This, of course, is understandable. China still has many other complex and serious civil rights, livelihood, and even ethnic issues unresolved; people are overwhelmed, so environmental issues are relatively neglected.

But is curbing global warming really unimportant and not urgent? Even for China alone, the problem is very serious, and the impact will be extremely fatal.

The most direct and obvious negative impact of global warming is the threat of rising global sea levels to coastal regions. China’s economy is likewise concentrated along its coasts. According to research, at the current pace of sea-level rise, Shanghai will become one of the earliest cities in the world to be submerged. By 2100, half of Shanghai’s area will be flooded. As for when Shanghai will be completely submerged, there is no definitive conclusion, but it will be within the next few generations. Apart from Shanghai, the entire Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, the Beijing–Tianjin–Tangshan region, and south-central Liaoning—China’s four largest industrial bases—will all face the danger of being submerged within decades or centuries. Studies predict that by 2100, as many as two billion people worldwide may become “climate refugees,” with China inevitably contributing at least several hundred million. At that time, China’s internal conflicts, especially class and regional conflicts, will intensify, and if they cannot be effectively managed, the possibility of civil war will arise.

If 2100 still seems too far off, beyond the lifespan of most people alive today, then present-day China is already suffering tangible disaster losses from climate anomalies. This year, Henan and Shanxi were hit by successive floods, killing hundreds and affecting tens of millions, bankrupting businesses and families. Although the death toll was not the highest in history, rainfall intensity exceeded all records. The lower death toll was mainly due to improved flood-control science and mechanisms compared to the past; the disasters themselves were more intense. In recent years, floods and droughts have occurred nationwide, and scientific research generally attributes them to climate change rather than historical norms. If climate deterioration continues, such extreme weather events will only increase in frequency and intensity. These are not just disasters but horrifying instances of death and the destruction of livelihoods and economies. If today a handful of people struggle for their lives in floods, in the future hundreds of thousands may simultaneously drown in overwhelming torrents—a terrifying scene. And with natural disasters comes human evil: looting, rape, and murder will erupt everywhere. Even in developed countries like the United States, the looting and violence in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina were shocking (though Katrina may not have been directly related to global warming, it illustrates the human calamities that follow major natural disasters).

Of course, some say humanity has always faced disasters with higher death tolls—such as Henan’s 1975 flood that killed 80,000, or countless deaths from historical floods, droughts, and plagues. But today is different. In the past, disasters struck because humans lacked the technology to resist nature, or due to accidents. Now, disasters are driven by clear climate change, which we have the means to prevent. Moreover, as societies progress, humanity values life more. The present and future are no longer, and should not be, eras in which millions of lives are treated as expendable. Humanity’s greatest advance has been learning to cherish life. Should we regress to the corpses-strewn chaos of ancient wars and famines? Just as untreated illnesses once killed millions, even small ailments that are now easily curable, today we cannot accept that. While deaths from irresistible forces cannot be prevented, we must still strive to avoid and mitigate what we can. On the individual level, one may die young, from accident, in middle age, or in old age. But if we detect danger or the onset of disease, we act to prevent or delay it. Although life and death are inevitable, unless faced with unbearable suffering, most people strive to live each minute well and avoid every danger. For humanity as a whole, it is the same.

All the more so, prevention is always better than scrambling at the last moment. If we do not now curb man-made climate anomalies but rely on luck and procrastination, then in the future, our descendants will struggle like ants in floods and droughts, dying one by one in despair. Such scenes have occurred in Chinese history and can be glimpsed even now (consider the desperate citizens trapped in Zhengzhou’s subway during the Henan floods). Historically, people were relatively numb; contemporary Chinese, even if not fully awakened, already possess modern emotions, dignity, values, and rights, with attachments and affections, joys and sorrows. The destruction of tens or hundreds of thousands of such lives would be a vast tragedy, a terrifying psychic shock. It has not yet happened, but when it does, it will be too late. Just as Nanjing residents before December 1937 or Henan’s Xinyang residents before 1959 did not foresee the coming cataclysms—unexpected disaster is not the same as impossible disaster. Psychological avoidance does not mean real escape; indeed, it reduces the chance of real escape. Of course, this is not idle alarmism, but recognition that ironclad evidence demands attention before it is too late.

We may think Greta Thunberg and others like her are obsessive or extreme—and indeed they have flaws—but their cries aim to prevent humanity, including the Chinese people, from falling into such disasters. Countless studies and observable realities confirm these outcomes are likely; we already see precursors measured in human lives. If we make more effort now, we can reduce the future’s unnatural deaths by hundreds of thousands, millions, or more—including tragically dying in floods, droughts, poverty, or wars.

Climate Issues and the Human Condition under Climate Policy

So, would global cooperation and full effort to curb climate change solve the problem? Of course, it is not that simple.

The man-made factors of global warming are directly tied to industrial and agricultural production. But in reality, it touches nearly every human interest. To curb global warming, all of humanity’s production and lifestyle must change. Moreover, this requires cooperation, compromise, and sacrifice from every country, class, group, and individual.

Industrial and agricultural production are the direct sources of emissions, but in large part it is consumption that drives production. Restricting production to curb warming will affect producers, but more so consumers. In many cases, consumers bear the greater cost. Yet consumers come from different classes and groups: when production is cut, the strong preserve their vested interests, and the weak bear the price.

Restricting production equals restricting consumption. If consumers will not voluntarily live low-carbon lives, they must pay higher prices for scarcer goods. The wealthy can absorb this, maintaining their lifestyles; the poor suffer or are forced into low-carbon living. Such emission cuts exploit and harm the poor. The wealthy will fight harder to maintain or enhance their privileges, seizing limited resources by any means. The weak become weaker, not only losing material benefits but relying more on the powerful for survival. It resembles a prison where scarce goods—a chicken claw, a cigarette, a seasoning packet—can control a man; two boxes of instant noodles and a jar of chili sauce can rule the prison. Modern civilization rests on material abundance and widespread consumer access; once scarcity is imposed, human rights and freedoms erode.

This leads to another effect: expanding state power, especially authoritarian centralization. As mentioned, cutting emissions requires global cooperation; domestically, it requires all classes, regions, industries, and groups to cooperate. But since emission cuts benefit and burden groups unequally, few in developing countries like China will voluntarily cede their interests. Thus, the state—especially the central government—must impose force to coordinate and allocate costs. Environmental policies require legal and national decrees, enforced by administration and judiciary, led by central decision-making. This favors authoritarianism: only centralized power can compel all regions and groups to share costs. And such centralization inevitably spreads beyond environmental policy.

This harms the building of a democratic, open, pluralistic society that protects individual rights. In mature democracies, harms are limited, and centralization can sometimes overcome local conservative resistance, with activism and debate refining democracy. But in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, centralization means reinforcing autocracy and shrinking personal and communal rights. Environmental policy lends legitimacy to dictatorship. Autocrats’ policies will benefit allies and harm opponents. Those who refuse to submit will be excluded under the pretext of “green correctness.” Power favors the strong and vested interests, stabilizing regimes and ensuring loyalty. Their methods are harsh, one-size-fits-all, disregarding rights—as seen in China’s one-child policy or COVID measures. Policies are enforced not by persuasion but by coercion, silencing media and criticism. “The people may be made to follow, but not made to understand”—this is China’s frequent approach to environmental policy.

Thus, inequalities between classes, regions, urban and rural, and industries will deepen. Conflicts intensify, driving regimes to tighten authoritarianism and mobilize repression, making society more oppressive and unequal.

In such an unequal society, voluntary carbon cuts are impossible; instead, the lower classes will rebel. Imagine: twenty years before carbon neutrality, a man unemployed from carbon policies, burdened by high prices, parents untreated, children unschooled, gaps with the rich widening, silenced by stability maintenance—yet one weekend he splurges on beef. A grassroots official kindly tells him, “Eat less beef, save our planet.” The man replies, “Sir, that’s your planet,” then enjoys his beef while secretly wishing the world destroyed. For common people, affordable food is their greatest joy, their only hope after toil. To strip even this—what shame remains?

Different groups have different hopes for the future. Some, able to ensure their children’s privilege, see a hopeful future. Others, bankrupt and desperate, see none. In despair, fairness may mean shared destruction. Such people rarely kill, but can easily refuse carbon cuts, letting Earth commit slow suicide.

In corrupt, distrustful states, disbelief in man-made warming is widespread. Generations of peasants and workers have been deceived by elites and authorities through policy, propaganda, and ideology. They have been cheated in dealings with government, courts, hospitals, schools. Thus society falls into a “Tacitus Trap” or “crying wolf”: even truthful warnings are dismissed as schemes. Indeed, such policies are often abused for profiteering, so their suspicion is not baseless—though it misleads fatally. Even in democracies, elites exploit commoners under legal guises.

So, can democratic societies achieve low-carbon living and emission targets? Clearly not. In the U.S., half deny man-made warming or doubt it deeply, rooted not only in interests but in religion. Devout believers will not act against their God’s will, even under threat of prison or death. Thus half of Americans will long continue high-carbon lives. This enrages the other half, who see unfairness: one side sacrifices, the other indulges. The former see fanatics, the latter see tyrants. Division deepens, society tears apart. As long as half of Americans emit freely, targets fail, warming worsens, and China, the EU, India, and others feel cheated. If the leader won’t comply, why should they? Aside from Northern and Western Europe, most states will follow suit, breaking pledges. Thus goals fail; at best warming slows. Without decisive breakthroughs, catastrophe still comes.  

Nor is the U.S. unique. Most democracies face this. Democracies must heed public opinion; leaders cannot decide alone. Even laws can be overturned by elections, civil disobedience, lawsuits, or protests. If livelihoods suffer, riots may follow. Thus emission cuts stall. Only Northern and Western Europe, combining democracy with high civic education and discipline, succeed. For most, autocracies are ironically more efficient. Extreme authoritarian states impose compliance with censorship, threats, arrests, coercion, and intimidation. Dissent is silenced; pain is absorbed or passed down. Thus policies succeed smoothly. Failures occur only when vested interests resist, not the people.  

This raises another question: the impact of climate issues and mitigation on politics, rights, and humanity. As said, climate harms are vast; sacrifices must be made. What is sacrificed is not only material interest but political rights, freedoms, and dignity. Emission cuts demand state intervention, bolstering authoritarianism. When carbon neutrality is prioritized, other rights are sidelined. It is like wartime, when victory overrides rights and freedoms. Though not as severe, the resemblance is strong.  

Developed democracies propose systemic solutions—above all, “equality,” and “supporting the weak.” To prevent inequality and conflict, they push income, rights, education, and healthcare equality, and compensate vulnerable groups most affected. The privileged are asked to contribute more. Democracies also adjust their systems to adapt to the climate era, reducing conflict and discontent. Crisis-driven reforms have often advanced human rights (as after the world wars and Cold War).  

But such measures are hard in developing, non-democratic states. There, emission cuts harm rights, and their aftermath further harms rights. Worse, some autocracies exploit the West’s climate urgency, trading emissions for reduced human rights scrutiny. The West prioritizes survival over others’ rights. Thus pressure to reform dwindles; repression worsens. Peoples suffer longer and deeper.  

Conflicts also erupt between nations and within them, driven by interests, grudges, values. Some wish rival nations drowned by the sea. How could cooperation happen? Even without enmity, major sacrifices—cutting industry, paying huge carbon taxes, absorbing millions of refugees—test whether states choose others’ survival over their own. Can fairness be achieved?  

Within unequal states, mutual aid is shallow. Regions resent one another. Inland residents denied urban rights won’t sacrifice to save coastal elites’ mansions. They may even hope for their submergence. Regional identities and disparities worsen resistance. This already appears (e.g., power cuts in China’s northeast sparking anger). When survival is at stake, fraternity vanishes. Even kin betray under mortal pressure; how much less compatriots?  

Likewise, the childless feel no duty to avert posthumous disasters. Why care for others’ children, when compatriots never cared for them? Why sacrifice for “the nation’s future” when overworked, underpaid, silenced, denied healthcare, housing, and dignity? Many turn hatred onto state and nation. Even parents, under survival stress, focus on today: schooling, jobs, medical bills—not floods decades away. Struggling for the present leaves no room for the future. Rulers, too, prioritize stability, expanding economies to appease factions. Cutting the “cake” for emissions worsens conflict and threatens collapse.  

Meanwhile, elites refuse to set examples. Unlike Western philanthropists, China’s wealthy indulge in carbon-heavy lives, at most performing token gestures. They demand rights without duties. Some openly say, “Cut emissions, but no carbon taxes.” In China, many agree. Worse, they exploit the crisis, grabbing resources through privilege and connections, monopolizing renewables for profit. Crooked leaders drain the nation for gain, passing disasters to posterity: “After me, the deluge.”  

Thus, global carbon neutrality on time is unlikely. Unless enforced by overwhelming power, or breakthroughs enable effortless neutrality, disasters will strike in decades or centuries. Millions, perhaps billions, will die; billions more will be refugees. Famines, poverty, and wars will follow. Humanity’s survival cannot be assured.  

Studies predict wars and terrorism from climate crises. The CIA recently warned of global conflict by 2040, especially in vulnerable Asia and Africa. “Climate wars” may involve geoengineering—droughts and floods weaponized. River basins like the Congo, Indus, Mekong, and Nile may become hotspots. History shows precedent: barbarian invasions of Rome, Mongol and Manchu invasions of China—climate-driven. But future wars may use missiles, even nukes, not swords and horses.  

Yet even knowing this, humanity will not surrender its interests. These also concern life and meaning. Few will sacrifice their families for strangers. For the oppressed, resistance is understandable.  

Of course, the future may not be so bleak. Humanity may unite, sacrifice, innovate, and prevail. Perhaps disasters strike but are overcome. Then deniers will say, “See, it was all a hoax.” Such words erase countless sacrifices. Yet even that is better than millions dying in apocalyptic floods, with survivors muttering, “It was God’s will.”  

But the likelihood of humanity perishing in climate disasters far outweighs salvation. Civilization painstakingly built may collapse.  

After millions of years of evolution, modern humans emerged 10,000 years ago, creating dazzling civilization in that short span. From primitive tribes to agriculture, industry, and the information age, humanity advanced at super speed. Material and spiritual civilization reached unprecedented heights. Survival improved dramatically. But these achievements created pollution and crises. Humanity faces its own disasters.  

Though the world teems with ugliness, selfishness, cruelty, lies, violence, oppression, and harm, there is also cooperation, warmth, sincerity, peace, justice, and sacrifice. Overall, humanity today enjoys the best life ever: rights, dignity, survival value, unimaginable in history. Most importantly, we still hope—hope for universal justice, prosperity, freedom, truth, and renewal. If such a hopeful humanity perishes in centuries by climate or unknown catastrophe, how tragic. We cannot bear to see Chinese civilization perish with the world. We still hope our descendants will witness democracy, rule of law, freedom, progress, and justice flourish in China.  

As a speck of dust in the cosmos, a flicker in human history, I cannot resist such vast forces. Even scaled down, even if billions act together, disasters like climate change may be unstoppable—or we may even be complicit. Even if we survive climate crises, an asteroid could wipe us out. Humanity is but a fragile passerby in cosmic history. Yet as “a thinking reed,” we must still struggle and record.  

                                                          Wang Qingmin  

                                                           2021.10.21

      Republican Calendar, Year 230, Month of Mist(Brume

)Day of the Peach  (first draft)  

                                   (revised multiple times thereafter)  

( In the summer of 2022, high-temperature disasters occurred across many parts of China, affecting hundreds of millions of people, with several individuals directly dying of “heat stroke.” The pace of this climate warming came even earlier than some scholars and media had predicted. Previously, it was still widely disbelieved that climate change was real, or many assumed that global warming would only harm other countries and would not affect themselves. Now, at last, there has begun to be some change in this perception, but it still has not reached a widespread awakening. Moreover, even if people now understand and begin to participate in curbing global warming, it is already too late.